A Climate Resilience Fund for New Zealand

Proposed Model: CIR-ACC (Climate Impact and Resilience – Accident Compensation Corporation framework)

Funding Structure: 40% Crown / 60% Levy-Funded | Actuarial Risk Model

May 2026

Paul  Martin –paulm100m@gmail.com

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Fund Architecture and Design Principles 4

Funding Model 5

Phase 1: Foundation and Legislative Development (2026-2027)

Phase 2: Parliamentary Process and Establishment (2027-2028)

Phase 3: Operational Launch and Pilot Programmes (2028-2029)

Phase 4: Full Operation and Integration (2029-2031)

Phase 5: Long-Term Maturity and Expansion (2031-2035+)

Governance Structure and Accountability

Local Government Access Framework

Risk Factors and Mitigation

Conclusion

Executive Summary

This document presents a comprehensive implementation timeline for establishing a National Climate Impact and Resilience Fund (CIR-ACC), modelled on New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) framework. The proposal originates from a District Council Annual Plan 2026/2027 submission, which identified the urgent need for a permanent, pre-funded mechanism to address climate-related infrastructure damage, managed retreat, and community resilience.

The current ad-hoc, post-disaster funding model leaves councils and ratepayers as insurers of last resort for climate volatility. The 2025 Tasman floods exposed the structural weaknesses in this approach, with fiscal shortfalls persisting despite central government co-funding. One-off funds are structurally incapable of keeping pace with the inevitable intensification and increased frequency of extreme weather events.

The ACC-type fund proposed here would operate as a mandatory, ring-fenced national mechanism, funded through a combination of levies on property insurance premiums, levies on commercial land value, and a fixed-ratio Crown contribution (40% Crown, 60% levy-funded). The fund would use an actuarial model where climate risk is annualised rather than capped per disaster, providing local government with predictable access to resources for both pre-emptive mitigation and post-event relief.

Key Features of the Proposed CIR-ACC
✓  Permanent, pre-funded mechanism replacing ad-hoc disaster bailouts✓  Actuarial risk model — climate risk annualised, not capped per event✓  Three funding streams: property insurance levy, commercial land value levy, Crown contribution✓  Dual purpose: pre-emptive mitigation AND post-event relief✓  Predictable access criteria for all local authorities✓  Independent governance with Crown, local government, and iwi/Maori representation 

Fund Architecture and Design Principles

Core Design Features

The CIR-ACC is designed around five core principles derived from the ACC model, adapted for climate risk management:

  1. Comprehensive Coverage: The fund covers all climate-related physical risks to public infrastructure, community assets, and household property, including gradual changes (sea-level rise, coastal erosion) and acute events (flooding, storms, wildfire).
  2. Community Responsibility: All property owners and commercial ratepayers contribute through established levy mechanisms, creating a broad risk pool that reduces individual burden and ensures equitable distribution of costs.
  3. Complete Rehabilitation: The fund covers not only emergency repair but also long-term resilience building, managed retreat, and ecological restoration — recognising that adaptation is a permanent condition, not a series of isolated responses.
  4. Administrative Efficiency: Predetermined eligibility criteria, standardised assessment protocols, and delegated decision-making authority enable rapid disbursement without sacrificing accountability.
  5. Actuarial Soundness: Premiums are set using climate risk modelling that annualises expected losses over long time horizons, ensuring the fund remains solvent as event frequency increases.

Funding Model

The proposed funding structure establishes three concurrent revenue streams:

Revenue StreamMechanismEstimated Annual Revenue
Property Insurance Levy2.5% levy on all domestic and commercial property insurance premiums; collected by insurers via RBNZ regulatory framework$350-450M
Commercial Land Value Levy0.3% levy on commercial and industrial rateable land values; collected via council rating systems$250-350M
Crown Contribution40% of actuarially assessed annual requirement; appropriated in Budget$200-400M
Total Annual Fund $800M-$1.2B

This model generates an estimated base fund of $800 million to $1.2 billion annually, escalating with property value growth and insurance premium increases. The actuarial approach means funds are available immediately when events occur, eliminating the current delays associated with emergency appropriations and post-event negotiations between central and local government.

Phase 1: Foundation and Legislative Development (2026-2027)

Q3 2026 – Q4 2027  |  Local government advocacy, policy development, and legislative drafting

Council Resolutions and Lobbying (Q3-Q4 2026)

The implementation begins at the local government level. Local, District and Regional Councils formally adopt resolutions calling for central government action. These resolutions specify the ACC-type model as the preferred mechanism and commit council resources to supporting the policy development process.

Council X Annual Plan 2026/2027 formally resolves to lobby for CIR-ACC legislation through Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ) and directly to the Minister for Emergency Management and the Minister for Climate Change

•  Regional councils, unitary authorities, and metropolitan councils in high-risk areas (Northland, Hawke’s Bay, West Coast, Canterbury) adopt parallel resolutions

•  LGNZ Climate Change and Emergency Management committees develop a consolidated national position paper endorsing the ACC-type mechanism

•  Formal engagement with the Climate Change Commission to incorporate the fund proposal into the National Adaptation Framework

Policy Development and Stakeholder Engagement (Q1-Q3 2027)

Central government agencies, led by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the Ministry for the Environment, establish an interdepartmental working group to develop detailed policy settings. This process involves extensive consultation with local government, iwi/Maori, the insurance sector, and climate adaptation experts.

•  NEMA convenes the CIR-ACC Policy Working Group with representatives from Treasury, MfE, MBIE, DIA, and Te Puni Kokiri

•  Reference group established including LGNZ, Insurance Council of New Zealand, Infrastructure Commission, and Climate Change Commission

•  Iwi/Maori advisory panel convened to ensure Treaty-compliant governance structures and equitable access mechanisms

•  Public consultation on high-level design principles, including levy rates, eligibility criteria, and governance arrangements

Legislative Drafting (Q2-Q4 2027)

The Parliamentary Counsel’s Office drafts the Climate Impact and Resilience Act, drawing on the ACC Act 2001, the Earthquake Commission Act 1993, and international precedents including the UK’s Flood Re and Australia’s proposed Cyclone Reinsurance Pool.

•  Draft legislation prepared establishing the CIR-ACC as an independent Crown entity with statutory objectives and operational independence

•  Levy collection mechanisms integrated with existing rating systems (via councils) and insurance regulatory frameworks (via RBNZ/FMA)

•  Eligibility criteria and access protocols codified, drawing on the National Policy Statement for Natural Hazards 2025

•  Governance framework established with independent board, Crown appointees, local government nominees, and iwi/Maori representation

PeriodKey Milestone
Jul 2026TDC Annual Plan adoption; formal resolution to lobby for CIR-ACC
Aug 2026LGNZ position paper development begins; regional council resolutions
Oct 2026Formal approaches to Ministers for Climate Change and Emergency Management
Feb 2027NEMA-led Policy Working Group convened; terms of reference agreed
Mar 2027Iwi/Maori advisory panel and sector reference groups established
May 2027Public consultation on design principles (8-week period)
Jul 2027Policy recommendations to Cabinet; legislative drafting instructions issued
Sep 2027Draft Climate Impact and Resilience Act completed
Nov 2027Cabinet approval to introduce legislation; Regulatory Impact Statement published

Phase 2: Parliamentary Process and Establishment (2027-2028)

Q4 2027 – Q4 2028  |  Legislative passage, entity establishment, and systems development

Parliamentary Process (Q4 2027 – Q3 2028)

The Climate Impact and Resilience Bill progresses through the full parliamentary process, including select committee scrutiny and public submissions. Given the cross-party consensus on climate adaptation evidenced in the National Adaptation Framework, the bill is treated as priority legislation.

•  Bill introduced to Parliament with first reading debate (December 2027)

•  Select committee inquiry with nationwide hearings (February-April 2028)

•  Submissions received from all 78 local authorities, iwi entities, insurance sector, infrastructure providers, and community organisations

•  Supplementary order papers addressing select committee recommendations (June 2028)

•  Second and third readings; Royal Assent by September 2028

Entity Establishment (Q2-Q4 2028)

Concurrently with the legislative process, the new entity is incorporated and key appointments made to enable rapid operationalisation following Royal Assent.

•  CIR-ACC incorporated as independent Crown entity (March 2028)

•  Independent board appointed: 7 members including chair, with expertise in climate science, actuarial assessment, local government, infrastructure, Maori governance, and risk management

•  Chief Executive recruited and appointed (May 2028)

•  Initial office establishment in Wellington with regional liaison teams

•  Memoranda of understanding executed with LGNZ, Insurance Council, EQC, and key government agencies

Systems and Capability Development (Q3-Q4 2028)

•  Actuarial model development: partnership with ACC’s actuarial team and international reinsurance specialists

•  Climate risk database integration: linking to NIWA, MfE hazard mapping, and council asset management systems

•  IT systems procurement and development for levy collection, claims processing, and disbursement

•  Staff recruitment: initial establishment of 45-60 FTE across actuarial, claims, governance, and regional liaison functions

•  Eligibility criteria and assessment frameworks finalised for the three funding streams

PeriodKey Milestone
Dec 2027Climate Impact and Resilience Bill introduced; first reading
Mar 2028CIR-ACC entity incorporated; board appointment process begins
Apr 2028Select committee report back; board appointments confirmed
May 2028Chief Executive appointed; regional liaison structure established
Jun 2028Actuarial partnership and climate risk database integration begins
Jul 2028IT systems procurement; staff recruitment commences
Sep 2028Royal Assent; Climate Impact and Resilience Act 2028 commences
Oct 2028Regulations gazetted; levy rates set for 2029 financial year
Nov 2028Full operational readiness review; systems testing complete

Phase 3: Operational Launch and Pilot Programmes (2028-2029)

Q4 2028 – Q4 2029  |  Levy collection commences, pilot programmes activated, first disbursements

Levy Collection and Revenue Establishment (Q4 2028 – Q1 2029)

The first levy collection cycle begins on 1 January 2029, with initial revenue flows establishing the fund’s capital base. The levy mechanism is integrated with existing systems to minimise administrative burden.

•  Property insurance premium levy (2.5%) collected via insurance companies on all domestic and commercial policies from 1 January 2029

•  Commercial land value levy (0.3%) collected via council rating systems from 1 July 2029 (aligned with rating year)

•  Crown contribution of 40% of forecast annual requirement appropriated in Budget 2029

•  Initial capital base estimated at $400-500 million by 30 June 2029

Pilot Mitigation Programme (Q1-Q4 2029)

A $150 million pilot programme for pre-emptive mitigation is launched, targeting high-priority projects that demonstrate the fund’s value in reducing long-term liability.

•  Round 1: Elevated bridges and critical infrastructure in flood-prone catchments ($60M)

•  Round 2: Managed retreat buy-outs for properties in unsustainable coastal and flood-risk locations ($50M)

•  Round 3: Wetland restoration and nature-based solutions for stormwater management ($40M)

Pilot Resilience Hub Programme (Q2-Q4 2029)

The community resilience hub stream supports development of solar+battery backup systems for emergency shelters and community facilities, building on the EPOD concept (Emergency Power Operating Devices).

•  Grants programme for community resilience hub establishment ($30M pilot)

•  Priority allocation to communities demonstrating high climate exposure and social vulnerability

•  Integration with Civil Defence Emergency Management Group planning

•  Technical standards and monitoring frameworks developed

PeriodKey Milestone
Jan 2029Insurance levy collection commences; first revenue flows
Feb 2029Pilot mitigation programme Round 1 opens (elevated infrastructure)
Mar 2029First claims protocol activated for qualifying events
Apr 2029Resilience hub pilot programme opens; regional liaison teams operational
May 2029Pilot mitigation Round 2 (managed retreat buy-outs)
Jul 2029Commercial land value levy collection commences via councils
Aug 2029Pilot mitigation Round 3 (wetland restoration); first resilience hub grants approved
Oct 2029Six-month operational review; levy compliance assessment
Dec 2029Annual report to Parliament; year-one actuarial valuation complete

Phase 4: Full Operation and Integration (2029-2031)

Q1 2030 – Q4 2031  |  Mature operations, full council access, actuarial refinement

Full Programme Rollout (2029/30 Financial Year)

With pilot learnings incorporated, the fund moves to full operational status. All three funding streams are available to all qualifying local authorities on a continuous basis.

•  Mitigation programme: $300M annually for elevated infrastructure, managed retreat, nature-based solutions, and flood protection

•  Relief programme: Event-triggered access for infrastructure repair, silt removal, temporary housing, and economic recovery (budget: $200-400M annually depending on event frequency)

•  Resilience hub programme: $60M annually for community facility upgrades with solar+battery backup, water resilience, and emergency communications

•  All 78 local authorities signed up with access protocols and pre-agreed assessment criteria

Actuarial Refinement and Levy Adjustment (2030-2031)

The first two full years of operational data enable actuarial refinement of levy rates, risk profiles, and funding allocations. The board conducts its first triennial levy review.

•  Triennial actuarial review completed (June 2031); levy rates adjusted based on emerging claims experience

•  Climate risk models updated with 2029-2031 event data and attribution science

•  Regional risk weightings refined to ensure equitable access across diverse hazard profiles

•  Investment strategy for fund reserves developed in partnership with NZ Super Fund / ACC Investment Management

Systems Integration (2030-2031)

•  Full integration with council asset management systems for automated exposure assessment

•  Real-time event monitoring linked to NIWA, GeoNet, and MetService data feeds

•  Pre-approved project pipelines enable rapid disbursement (72-hour approval for pre-qualified projects)

•  Annual resilience reporting integrated with council long-term plan and annual plan cycles

PeriodKey Milestone
Jan 2030Full mitigation programme opens ($300M); all councils eligible
Mar 2030First annual actuarial assessment; reserve adequacy review
Jul 2030First full year of dual levy collection; Crown contribution review
Sep 2030Integrated council asset management systems pilot (10 councils)
Dec 2030Two-year operational review; Parliamentary select committee briefing
Mar 2031Real-time event monitoring system operational
Jun 2031Triennial levy review completed; rates adjusted for FY2031/32
Sep 2031Full council systems integration; pre-approved project pipeline active
Dec 2031Three-year actuarial valuation; investment strategy for reserves adopted

Phase 5: Long-Term Maturity and Expansion (2031-2035+)

2032 onwards  |  Continuous improvement, expanded scope, international learning

Fund Maturity (2032-2035)

By 2032, the CIR-ACC is a mature, well-capitalised institution with established governance, proven operational systems, and strong actuarial foundations. The focus shifts to continuous improvement, scope refinement, and preparation for escalating climate impacts projected through mid-century.

•  Projected fund balance of $2.5-3.5 billion by 2035, with annual levy revenue exceeding $1.2 billion

•  Full actuarial cost-benefit data available demonstrating return on mitigation investment (target: 5:1 benefit-cost ratio for pre-emptive works)

•  Managed retreat programme scaled to support 2,000-3,000 property acquisitions annually in high-risk zones

•  Community resilience hub network reaches 300+ facilities nationwide

Scope Expansion and Adaptation (2033-2035+)

As climate science evolves and operational experience accumulates, the fund’s scope may expand to address emerging risks and opportunities identified through the six-yearly National Climate Change Risk Assessment cycle.

•  Potential expansion to cover climate-related business interruption for SMEs in qualifying events

•  Integration with biodiversity and ecological restoration objectives (blue carbon, catchment restoration)

•  International reinsurance partnership to manage tail-risk events exceeding fund capacity

•  Development of parametric insurance products for rapid disbursement in predictable event types

Legislative Review (2034)

The Climate Impact and Resilience Act 2028 includes a mandatory five-year legislative review. This review assesses the fund’s performance against statutory objectives, governance effectiveness, levy adequacy, and scope appropriateness.

•  Independent review panel appointed by the Minister (Q1 2034)

•  Public submissions on fund performance and future priorities (Q2 2034)

•  Recommendations to Parliament for legislative amendments if required (Q4 2034)

•  Second six-yearly National Climate Change Risk Assessment (2032) informs review scope

PeriodKey Milestone
2032Fund matures; $2.5B+ balance; 5:1 mitigation benefit-cost demonstrated
2033Scope expansion options assessed; business interruption pilot considered
2034Mandatory five-year legislative review; independent panel appointed
2035Amended legislation (if required); international reinsurance partnerships
2036+Continuous adaptation to escalating risks; parametric products; blue carbon integration

Governance Structure and Accountability

The CIR-ACC operates as an independent Crown entity with a governance structure designed to balance operational independence with public accountability:

ElementDescription
Legal FormIndependent Crown entity under the Crown Entities Act 2004, with specific provisions in the Climate Impact and Resilience Act 2028
Board7 independent members with expertise in climate science, actuarial assessment, local government, infrastructure, Maori governance, and risk management
Crown OversightResponsible Ministers (Climate Change and Finance); monitoring under Crown Entities Act framework
Iwi/Maori ParticipationStatutory board position; dedicated advisory committee; Treaty compliance audit function
Local Government VoiceBoard position nominated by LGNZ; formal consultation on eligibility criteria and levy settings
AuditFinancial audit by Auditor-General; actuarial review by independent actuary; performance against statutory objectives

The board comprises seven members appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of Ministers. Appointment criteria ensure expertise in climate science, actuarial assessment, local government, infrastructure delivery, Maori governance, community resilience, and financial management. Board members serve staggered four-year terms with one reappointment permitted.

An independent actuary reviews the fund’s solvency annually, with a full actuarial valuation every three years. The Auditor-General audits the fund’s financial statements and performance against statutory objectives. The fund reports annually to Parliament through the appropriate select committee.

Local Government Access Framework

All 78 local authorities (regional councils, unitary authorities, territorial authorities, and district health boards where relevant) have access to the CIR-ACC through three distinct pathways:

Stream 1: Pre-emptive Mitigation

Councils submit project proposals against predetermined eligibility criteria. Projects must demonstrate a positive benefit-cost ratio, alignment with district/regional climate adaptation plans, and deliver measurable risk reduction. Assessment criteria prioritise projects protecting critical infrastructure, reducing community vulnerability, and delivering co-benefits for biodiversity and water quality.

Stream 2: Post-Event Relief

Following a qualifying climate event (defined by intensity thresholds linked to NIWA and MetService data), affected councils activate the relief protocol. Pre-negotiated assessment contracts enable rapid damage evaluation, with 72-hour approval for pre-qualified response categories. The fund covers infrastructure repair, silt and debris removal, temporary accommodation, and economic recovery support for affected communities.

Stream 3: Community Resilience Hubs

The resilience hub stream provides capital grants for community facilities that can function as emergency shelters during infrastructure disruption. Eligible projects include solar+battery installations, water independence systems, emergency communications upgrades, and accessibility improvements. Priority allocation uses a vulnerability index combining climate exposure, social deprivation, and infrastructure dependency metrics.

StreamAnnual AllocationEligible Activities
Pre-emptive Mitigation$300M (base)Elevated infrastructure, managed retreat, wetland restoration, flood protection, nature-based solutions
Post-Event Relief$200-400M (variable)Infrastructure repair, silt removal, temporary housing, economic recovery support
Community Resilience Hubs$60M (base)Solar+battery systems, water independence, emergency comms, accessibility upgrades

Risk Factors and Mitigation

The successful establishment and operation of the CIR-ACC depends on managing several key risks:

Risk FactorMitigation Strategy
Political discontinuityBipartisan support locked in through select committee process; statutory independence protects against ministerial interference
Levy resistancePhased introduction starting at 50% of target rates; public education campaign; clear demonstration of benefit-cost advantage
Event frequency exceeding actuarial projectionsPrudential capital buffer (target 120% of expected liabilities); reinsurance for tail risks; triennial levy review mechanism
Council capacity constraintsRegional liaison team support; simplified application processes for pre-qualified projects; technical assistance grants
Moral hazardCo-funding requirements (minimum 20% council contribution for mitigation); benefit-cost thresholds; post-event accountability measures
Treaty compliance failuresStatutory Maori board position; independent Treaty compliance audit; iwi/Maori advisory committee with formal consultation rights

Conclusion

The Climate Impact and Resilience Fund represents a structural transformation in how Aotearoa New Zealand finances climate adaptation. By replacing the current ad-hoc, post-disaster model with a permanent, pre-funded, actuarially sound mechanism, the CIR-ACC provides local government with the certainty and resources needed to plan for a future of intensifying climate risk.

The implementation timeline presented here — spanning from council resolutions in 2026 to full operational maturity by 2032 — is ambitious but achievable. It requires sustained political commitment, effective collaboration between central and local government, meaningful partnership with iwi/Maori, and public acceptance of the levy mechanisms that underpin the fund’s financial sustainability.

The cost of delay is substantial. Each year without a permanent fund locks in additional vulnerability, defers critical mitigation investments, and ensures that when the next major event strikes, communities and ratepayers will once again bear the full burden of recovery. The experience of New Zealand’s Tasman District in 2026 confirms that climate change is not a series of isolated emergencies — it is a permanent, intensifying condition. The CIR-ACC is the institutional response that permanence demands.

Climate Resilience Starts with Certainty, Not Crisis

How Gulf Oil Disruptions Threaten Australia and New Zealand’s Energy Security

The Global Context: A Crisis Without Precedent

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has created what the International Energy Agency calls “the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market” . Flows through the Strait—normally carrying 20 million barrels daily—have fallen to “a trickle,” with oil exports from Gulf producers dropping from approximately 20 million barrels per day to just 3.8 mb/d in early April .

This isn’t just about crude oil. The crisis has triggered unprecedented price spikes in refined products, with Singapore middle distillate prices reaching all-time highs above $290/barrel . For Australia and New Zealand—nations at the end of global supply chains—the implications are immediate and severe.


Price Forecasts: What to Expect by June 2026

Given that the war against Iran by Israel and the US is an existential one for Iran- i.e. Israel, and likely the US’s intent, is to destroy Iran as a cohesive state and break it into statelets who can no longer pose a threat to Israel’s Greater Israel project or disrupt future US control over Iranian oil, any peace agreement for Iran must include continued control over the State of Hormuz to ensure the state of Iran’s continued viability. It is unlikely that the US will concede to this in the short to medium term, especially given the control that Israel currently has over US foreign policy.

Additionally, should the US attempt further substantial attacks on Iranian infrastructure after the ceasefire likely ends on May 20th 2026, Iran has promised to destroy other Gulf States energy infrastructure.

If the Strait of Hormuz remains closed or severely constrained through June 2026 or longer, energy markets face a prolonged supply crisis with cascading price effects:

Crude Oil and Refined Product Prices

ProductCurrent/Recent PriceJune 2026 Forecast (Hormuz Closed)Source
Brent Crude~$103/bbl (March avg)$115+/bbl (EIA peak forecast for Q2 2026)
Singapore Gasoil (Diesel)$192/bbl (April)$200-250+/bbl (IEA alternative scenario)
Singapore Jet FuelSurged 114% since Feb 28$250-300+/bbl (record highs sustained)
VLSFO (Bunker Fuel)S$2.30/litre (Singapore)S$2.50-3.00+/litre (competing demand from refiners)
Australian Retail DieselAUD $3.20+/litreAUD $3.50-4.00+/litre (potential doubling if crisis persists)
Australian Retail Petrol~$2.20/litre (post-excise cut)AUD $2.50-3.00/litre
US Retail Diesel~$5.80/gallon (April peak)$6.00-7.00+/gallon

The International Energy Agency (IEA) has presented two scenarios: a base case assuming gradual resumption of Hormuz flows by mid-year, and an alternative “prolonged conflict” case where “energy markets and economies around the world need to brace for significant disruptions in the months to come”. Under the prolonged conflict scenario, physical crude prices could sustain levels near $150/bbl, with refined products trading at unprecedented premiums .

As of mid-April 2026, oil futures traders are maintaining an almost constant West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil price per barrel of around $100 US, while real Dated oil prices hover around the $140 mark. Futures traders are for some reason responding to oft repeated wild claims by Trump that victory, a peace agreement or at least an opening of the Straits, is imminent.

The IEA estimates it will take 2 years for global oil supplies to return to their previous levels once the Strait is reopened because of the extensive damage to Gulf refineries, storage facilities and docks.

Key Price Drivers

  • Diesel shortage structural: The IEA estimates 3-4 million barrels per day of diesel supply loss (5-12% of global consumption) directly tied to Hormuz disruptions
  • Refinery capacity offline: Middle East and Asian refineries cut runs by ~6 mb/d in April, tightening global product markets
  • Brent-WTI spread widening: The spread reached $12/bbl in March and is projected to peak at $15/bbl in April, reflecting Asian supply anxiety

Australia: The Diesel Nation at Breaking Point

The Dependency Problem

Australia is perhaps the most vulnerable developed nation to a liquid fuel emergency. In FY2021, 91% of all fuel consumed in Australia was imported—including 68% as refined products and imported crude for our remaining refineries .

Over the past 20 years, Australia like many other Western countries has substantially reduced the number of oil refineries on shore, opting instead for those refineries to become solely storage facilities for distilled oil products; predominantly from Asia. Two active refineries remain in Australia with the smaller one recently impacted by a refinery fire.

Australia sits at the end of a complex supply chain stretching thousands of kilometers from Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, and Japan. While only a small fraction of their diesel imports come directly from the Middle East, almost half of the crude oil for production of that diesel originates in the Middle East when traced back through those Asian refineries.

The Diesel Consumption Profile

Australia’s economy runs on diesel. In 2025, the nation consumed approximately 35 billion litres of diesel—far exceeding the 15 billion litres of petrol and 10 billion litres of aviation fuel . The consumption breakdown reveals critical vulnerabilities:Table

SectorDiesel ShareAnnual ConsumptionVulnerability Level
Mining40% of total diesel~14 billion litresCRITICAL
Road Transport/Trucking24%~8.4 billion litresHIGH
Agriculture8%~2.8 billion litresHIGH
Manufacturing7%~2.5 billion litresMEDIUM
Marine/RailSignificant~3+ billion litresMEDIUM
Passenger Vehicles~25% of remainder~4+ billion litresMEDIUM

Australia has one of the highest per capita diesel demands in the world—7.4 barrels per person annually—far exceeding the US and other major economies .

The Refinery Crisis

Australia’s domestic refining capacity has collapsed. Five refineries closed over the last decade, leaving just two operational: Ampol’s Lytton refinery in Brisbane and Viva’s Geelong refinery in Victoria. These facilities were already struggling before the current crisis—and then came the April 2026 fire at Geelong.

The fire at Viva Energy’s Geelong refinery—built in the 1950s—shut down critical units. As analyst Kevin Morrison noted: “This creates the conditions for higher prices, as it pushes up international demand for refined products when supply is massively constrained. It could not happen at a worse time.” Victoria alone consumes 252,000 barrels of fuel daily—41% diesel, 22% jet fuel—and now faces sourcing these volumes from already-tight Asian markets.

The structural problem? Our remaining refineries are configured to produce mostly petrol rather than aviation fuel and diesel—precisely the fuels most critical for agriculture, road freight, mining, and defense .

Stockholding: The 90-Day Myth

Australia has been in breach of International Energy Agency (IEA) obligations since 2012. The IEA requires 90 days of net import coverage; Australia holds just 68 IEA days, and when measured against actual consumption, this equates to roughly 30-34 days of real fuel security .

The government counts “fuel in transit”—on foreign-flagged tankers in foreign ports—toward reserves. But as the Australia Institute notes: “In the event of a global emergency, there is no guarantee that the oil that Australia has been promised access to… would be practically accessible.” These ships are not Australian vessels; they sail under foreign flags and owe no allegiance to Australian fuel security.

With the Strait closed, Australia is now pulling diesel along some of the longest and most expensive trade routes in the world—13,000-mile journeys from the US Gulf Coast taking up to two months .

Mining Sector: The $4.5 Billion Diesel Addiction

The mining industry is Australia’s most diesel-exposed sector, consuming approximately 9.6 billion litres annually—roughly 40% of national diesel consumption and 10% of total national energy use . The sector operates more than 50,000 large diesel-powered trucks, each consuming approximately 900,000 litres annually .

Cost Impact Calculations:

  • At pre-crisis diesel prices (~AUD $1.75/litre), a large mine’s annual fuel bill for a 200hp tractor running 1,500 hours was ~$74,000
  • At current prices (~AUD $2.25-2.50/litre), that same operation costs $100,000-112,000 annually—a 35-50% increase
  • If prices reach $3.50-4.00/litre by June, costs could double from the original baseline

According to S&P Global and BMO estimates using Wood Mackenzie data, every 10% increase in oil prices drives mining cost increases of:

  • Iron ore: +4.2% mining costs
  • Copper: +3.5% mining costs
  • Gold: +2% mining costs

With crude oil potentially averaging $100+/bbl (47% above 2025 average), mining costs could rise 16-20% for bulk commodities .

Operational Risks: The mining industry faces a shutdown timeline measured in weeks if diesel supplies are interrupted:

  • Best-positioned mines: 4-8 weeks of operational capacity
  • Typical remote diesel-heavy mines: 2-6 weeks before curtailment
  • Weakest operations: Days to 2 weeks

The ASX Materials Index has already plunged 20.3% since the conflict began, with fund managers dumping stocks amid fears of fuel shortages forcing production cuts .

Agriculture: Harvest Season Crisis

Australian agriculture consumes approximately 2.5 billion litres of diesel annually, with diesel accounting for 84% of on-farm energy consumption . The crisis has hit at the worst possible time—during harvest season when fuel demand peaks .

Impact on Farm Economics:

  • A farm using 80,000 litres annually faced fuel costs of ~$140,000 at $1.75/litre pre-crisis
  • At current $2.25+/litre, costs have jumped to $180,000+ annually—a $40,000+ increase per farm
  • If diesel reaches $3.50/litre by June, that same farm faces $280,000 annual fuel costsdouble pre-crisis levels

Farmers are already making critical decisions about whether to proceed with crops given uncertainty about diesel allocations later in the year . Adding diesel and freight costs means nearly 60% of farmers’ cost base is increasing rapidly .

The Fuel Tax Credits Scheme (FTCS)—which provides AU$4.5 billion annually to mining and AU$1.3 billion to agriculture—has become a critical but increasingly inadequate buffer .

Food Supply Chain: From Farm to Shelf

Australia’s food supply chain is diesel-dependent at every stage:

  • Production: Tractors, harvesters, irrigation pumps
  • Processing: Generators, machinery
  • Distribution: Road trains, trucking (24% of national diesel consumption)

Higher diesel costs cascade through the food system:

  • Transport costs increase directly with fuel prices
  • Processing costs rise due to diesel-powered equipment
  • Retail prices must absorb these increases or face margin compression

The Australian Industry Group warns that disruption to fuel markets creates cascading supply chain impacts, with businesses already reporting fuel-related operational challenges .

Tourism and Aviation

The tourism sector faces a triple hit:

  1. Jet fuel costs: Singapore jet fuel surged 114% since February 28
  2. Airfare increases: AirAsia X has increased fares by up to 40% due to fuel costs
  3. Ground transport: Higher petrol and diesel costs affect rental cars, tour buses, and visitor travel patterns

Air New Zealand has already canceled 1,100 flights impacting over 44,000 passengers between March and early May due to fuel cost pressures .

The Australian Government Response

On March 30, 2026, the Australian National Cabinet activated the National Fuel Security Plan, currently at Level 2 (“Keeping Australia Moving”) . Measures include:

  • Halving fuel excise from 52.6 cents to 20.6 cents per litre for three months
  • Temporarily reducing minimum stockholding obligations by 20% for diesel and petrol
  • Amending fuel quality standards to allow higher sulfur levels, releasing ~100 million litres/month of additional petrol supply
  • Appointing a Fuel Security Taskforce Coordinator
  • Underwriting additional fuel cargoes and strategic reserves

However, energy analysts question whether the excise cut was optimally targeted. Macquarie University’s Lurion De Mello notes: “Petrol is not the pain point. Diesel is the pain point” . Deakin University’s Samantha Hepburn warns: “Any disruption in diesel supply or sustained high prices… will directly affect production capacity, increase operating costs and ultimately push up food prices” .

The Australia Institute recommends accelerating electric vehicle adoption to reduce petrol demand, thereby freeing refining capacity for diesel and jet fuel security .


New Zealand: The Marsden Point Gamble

The Refinery Closure Decision

New Zealand made a calculated bet in 2022—and now faces the consequences. The Marsden Point refinery, which produced half the country’s petrol, two-thirds of diesel, and most jet fuel, was converted to an import terminal. The rationale was economic: the refinery was inefficient by international standards, and importing refined products from mega-refineries in Asia was cheaper.

The government and industry argued this improved security: “Closing the refinery has actually improved our security of supply, as there is now more than twice as much fuel on the water to replenish domestic stocks than when we produced it locally.”

But this logic contains a fatal flaw. New Zealand no longer imports crude oil—but the Asian refineries we depend on do. In 2024, New Zealand’s top four source countries (Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, Japan) sourced almost 80% of their crude oil imports from Persian Gulf countries .

As MFAT’s July 2025 analysis states: “In the event of disruption of Middle Eastern supply, Asian refineries would be forced to source crude product from elsewhere, pushing up the global price for oil” . New Zealand faces indirect but severe exposure to Gulf disruptions through our refined product suppliers.

Current stock levels provide approximately 47 days of diesel, 51 days of petrol, and 49 days of jet fuel coverage—better than Australia but still precarious if Asian refining capacity falters .

As of mid-April 2026, the New Zealand government’s sole strategy has been to monitor the volume and consequent days left of the various oil substrates in the country. The reality is that the risks to New Zealand’s economy are the combined factors of stocks available and the cost at the pump of those stocks New Zealand may well find that by June there are still tankers available to supply oil substrates to New Zealand but at a price that is unaffordable to the public.

Already truck operators are warning of hugely increased supermarket food prices in the pipeline because of the massively increased transport costs involved in supplying the supermarkets from New Zealand’s highly centralised grocery supply chain. Decentralisation of essential services across new Zealand is thus a very urgent priority.

Economic Impact Forecasts

ASB Bank has downgraded New Zealand’s growth outlook due to the fuel crisis, forecasting:

  • GDP growth slowing through 2026
  • Inflation rising toward 4% before easing in 2027
  • Households facing $4,000-6,000 annual hit if fuel prices stay elevated

Westpac identifies tourism as particularly vulnerable, forecasting that “the most direct impact of the shock on exports will likely show up in falling visitor numbers” due to flight disruptions, higher airfares, and consumer reluctance to travel internationally during heightened tensions .

Tourism Sector Impact

New Zealand’s tourism sector—still recovering from COVID-19—faces severe headwinds:

  • Flight cancellations and route reductions: Air New Zealand has already cut capacity
  • Higher airfares: Jet fuel costs have surged 114%, forcing ticket price increases
  • Reduced international visitor numbers: Westpac expects reversal of recent strong growth in arrivals
  • Domestic tourism pressure: Higher petrol prices reduce Kiwis’ willingness to travel domestically

Regional Variations: Regions dependent on self-drive tourism—West Coast, Tasman, Southland, Gisborne—face particular pressure. These areas already have disproportionate visitor spending on fuel, primarily because of a lack of local international airports, making them vulnerable to petrol price volatility .

Tourism Industry Aotearoa reports businesses are experiencing “sharp increase in business costs as a result of the leap in fuel prices” . The NZX50 fell nearly 6% in March 2026, with travel and tourism stocks—including Serko, Air New Zealand, Tourism Holdings, SkyCity Entertainment, and Auckland International Airport—among the hardest hit .

The Political Reckoning

The Marsden Point closure has become politically contentious. New Zealand First MP Shane Jones, now Associate Energy Minister, has called the previous government’s decision “reckless.” Westpac chief economist Kelly Eckhold has challenged critics: “Would you close it if it was open today?”

Reopening Marsden Point is likely impossible. The refinery was configured to process imported Middle Eastern crude—not New Zealand’s own light, sweet domestic production, which is entirely exported. Even if the infrastructure remained intact (it doesn’t), the facility couldn’t process local oil.

Government Response

New Zealand has activated its Fuel Response Plan 2026, currently in Phase 1: Watchful . The plan outlines four clear phases responding proportionately to fuel security risks, assessed separately for petrol, diesel, and jet fuel. The government is:

  • Monitoring fuel stocks and shipments
  • Publishing twice-weekly stock updates
  • Coordinating with international partners
  • Preparing demand reduction measures if needed

MBIE emphasizes: “There is no need to change how you purchase fuel. Sticking to your usual habits helps keep the system running smoothly” .

However this ‘plan” does not seem to acknowledge the high probability of both lack of, and high prices for diesel, jet fuel and bunker oil in the longer term. Strategies that prioritise and create backup storage now for essential fuel service issues such as food transportation and health and emergency services are sadly lacking.

Its also important to acknowledge that for New Zealand to continue to received international shipping and jet flights it needs to have adequate fuel storage for that transport to return to their original port.


The Bunker Fuel Dimension

Both Australia and New Zealand face parallel challenges with marine fuel. Very Low Sulphur Fuel Oil (VLSFO)—the 0.5% sulphur fuel required by IMO 2020 regulations—depends on specific low-sulphur crude grades that are now being competed for by refiners seeking diesel replacements.

Australian and New Zealand ports rely on Singapore and regional refineries for bunker fuel. As Vortexa analysis warns: with Hormuz disruptions, bunkering hubs like Singapore, Malaysia, and the Netherlands could face VLSFO supply shortages as refiners outbid bunker blenders for suitable crude grades .

This threatens not just commercial shipping but coastal trade, fishing fleets, and offshore industries that keep both economies functioning.


Strategic Implications & Recommendations

For Australia:

  1. Diesel is the vital risk: Agriculture, mining, and road freight depend on diesel. The BADSP program addresses storage but not supply diversity .
  2. Refining vulnerability: Two aging refineries cannot meet national demand. The Geelong fire demonstrates how quickly capacity can be lost .
  3. Transit risk: 21+ days of “reserves” exist only on paper—on foreign ships that may never arrive in a crisis .
  4. US Strategic Petroleum Reserve access: The 2020 agreement to access US reserves sounds reassuring, but fuel would take three weeks to reach Australia—and in a global crisis, American domestic needs would take precedence .
  5. Mining sector transition: Rio Tinto’s renewable diesel trials at Boron and Kennecott mines show potential, but these transitions were planned for 2030-2050—not 2026 .

For New Zealand:

  1. Refined product dependency: 100% reliance on Asian refineries creates single-point-of-failure risk .
  2. Indirect Gulf exposure: While NZ doesn’t import Gulf crude directly, our suppliers do—making us hostage to their sourcing challenges .
  3. Storage limitations: Current stock levels are adequate for normal operations but insufficient for prolonged disruption .
  4. No refining fallback: Unlike Australia, New Zealand has zero domestic refining capacity to fall back on .
  5. Tourism vulnerability: The sector’s recovery from COVID-19 faces reversal due to fuel costs and flight disruptions .

And let us also not forget the hugely significant global impacts of the loss of 20% of the world’s synthetic fertilisers, of sulphuric acid, and of LNG because of the Straits’ closure and the partial destruction of refining in the Gulf states.

The Path Forward

Both nations face the same fundamental challenge: they are price-takers in a volatile market, with limited ability to influence supply or substitute fuels in the short term.

Both Australia and New Zealand have optimised for economic efficiency (Just In Time processes) over energy security. In a world of renewed geopolitical conflict and supply chain fragility, that calculation desperately needs revision.

Increasing frequency and intensity of global weather events will undoubtedly and increasingly put severe pressure on global supply chains . Transitioning to a less oil dependant economy and one which is less dependant on global supply chains for all essential services, is vital.


Sources:

  • Australia Institute: “Over a Barrel: Addressing Australia’s Liquid Fuel Security”
  • Australian Government: National Fuel Security Plan
  • Australian Industry Group: “Fuel Supply and Supply Chain Watch”
  • ABC News: “Energy analysts raise concerns on fuel excise cut”
  • Commonwealth Bank: “How Aussie farmers are navigating fuel and fertiliser pressures”
  • Deloitte Access Economics via Financial Post: “Australian Fuel Supply to Get Even Tighter After Refinery Fire”
  • EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, April 2026
  • Fortune: “Oil prices may be falling, but for the wrong reason”
  • IEA Oil Market Report, April 2026
  • IEEFA: “Mining’s costly diesel addiction must be a budget priority”
  • Living More With Less: “Implications of the Iran war on Australia’s Fuel Supplies”
  • MFAT: “NZ economy not immune to conflict in the Middle East”
  • MBIE: “Middle East conflict and New Zealand’s fuel stocks”
  • Newsroom: “Economic growth forecasts downgraded as fuel price rise bites”
  • NZ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment: “Understanding variability in tourism spend”
  • P2P Agri: “Iran Fuel Crisis and Australian Farm Costs”
  • RenewEconomy: “Diesel replacement: Australia’s billion-dollar opportunity”
  • The Oregon Group: “Strait of Hormuz diesel shock threatens mining industry”
  • Transporting NZ: “Energy security – was closing Marsden Point a mistake?”
  • Vortexa/IEA analysis on VLSFO supply and bunker fuel markets
  • Westpac IQ: “NZ business feedback on recent oil price moves”
  • World Socialist Web Site: “War-driven fuel crisis threatens recession in Australia”
  • https://energyandresilience.substack.com/p/the-limits-to-the-energy-transition

The Yemen Tragedy

Now that Trump ( as of May 2025) has made the decision not to continue U.S. air attacks on targets in Yemen (for now), the following semi-legal analysis of the strikes below is perhaps somewhat moot. However it does provide a glimpse into the legalities of the multiple aggressions by Western countries in the past 75 years since World War 2.

After an almost shootdown of an ‘invisible’ US F35 aircraft, and the loss of 2 (possibly 3) F18s (valued at $70 million each) that had ‘fallen off’ US aircraft carriers in the Gulf, along with about 10, 30 million dollar MQ9 drones shot down by Ansar-allah (what the West MSM as one voice like to call “Iran backed rebel Houthis”-all in one breath), it must have been clearly apparent, even to Trump, that the billion dollar US bombing campaign against Yemen was going nowhere.

Additionally, because the US had (and has) very little accurate information on where Ansarallah weapons and military was on the ground they were in fact predominantly (and accidentally?) hitting civilians. In addition the long-standing U.K air support for the Americans on the Arabian peninsula was entirely without targeting or strategy, but largely an attempt to try and demonstrate that Britain was still a force to be reckoned with in the Gulf.

One cannot however be so charitable about Israeli bombings of civilian Yemen targets-(civilian ports and airports), who used their traditional methods of terror and brutality to try and intimidate Ansarallah.

What follows is an analysis of the legalities of this bombing campaign, supposedly initiated by first Biden and then Trump, to stop Ansarallah closing the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea to shipping bound for the Israeli Red Sea port of Eilat (top right hand section of map)

Legal Analysis of US/UK Strikes in Yemen and Potential Violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

The US and UK military interventions in Yemen, particularly against Houthi targets, raise significant legal questions under international humanitarian law (IHL)—also known as the laws of war. Below is a deeper examination of their compliance with key legal principles.


Analysis of the Legal Framework Governing US Strikes against Yemen

A. Applicable Law

  • Geneva Conventions (1949) & Additional Protocol I (1977): Govern the conduct of hostilities, including distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.
  • UN Charter (Article 2(4) & Article 51): Prohibits the use of force except in self-defense or with UN Security Council authorization.
  • Customary IHL: Binding on all parties, including non-state actors like the Houthis.

B. Justifications for US/UK Strikes

  • Self-Defense Argument (Article 51, UN Charter): The US and UK argue strikes are necessary to protect maritime security (Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping).
  • Legal Debate: Some scholars argue this stretches self-defense doctrine, as Houthi attacks may not constitute an “armed attack” justifying unilateral force.
  • Collective Self-Defense (Supporting Saudi Arabia & UAE): Previously invoked, but less relevant post-2022 since the Saudi-Houthi truce.

2. Key IHL Principles & Potential Violations

A. Principle of Distinction (Civilian vs. Military Targets)

  • Rule: Attacks must only target military objectives, not civilians or civilian infrastructure.
  • Concerns in Yemen:
  • Urban Warfare: Houthis embed military assets in densely populated areas, increasing civilian risk.
  • Reports of Civilian Harm: NGOs (e.g., Mwatana, Amnesty) allege US/UK strikes hit homes, farms, and markets, suggesting possible indiscriminate targeting.

B. Principle of Proportionality

  • Rule: Civilian harm must not be excessive relative to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
  • Challenges:
  • “Double-Tap” Strikes: Some reports suggest follow-up strikes hit first responders, which could be a war crime if deliberate.
  • High Civilian Toll in Past Strikes: Even if targets are legitimate, large-scale civilian casualties (e.g., 2022 Saada prison strike by Saudi coalition) raise proportionality concerns.

C. Precautions in Attack

  • Rule: Parties must take all feasible measures to verify targets and minimize civilian harm.
  • US/UK Practices:
  • Use of precision-guided munitions (reduces but does not eliminate risk).
  • Lack of Transparency: Few public investigations into alleged civilian harm, unlike in Iraq/Syria.

3. Accountability & Legal Consequences

A. Mechanisms for Accountability

  1. Domestic Investigations (US/UK):
  • The US has a Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) but rarely discloses Yemen investigations.
  • The UK has no independent Yemen strike review body, unlike its Iraq/Syria oversight.
  1. International Criminal Court (ICC):
  • Yemen is not an ICC member, but if nationals of member states commit crimes on Yemeni soil, the ICC could theoretically investigate.
  1. Universal Jurisdiction:
  • Third countries could prosecute war crimes under universal jurisdiction (e.g., Germany’s case against Syrian officials).

B. State Responsibility & Reparations

  • Under IHL, states must provide reparations for unlawful strikes, but neither the US nor UK has a compensation program for Yemeni victims.
  • Contrast with US payments for civilian harm in Afghanistan/Iraq.

4. Broader Implications & Legal Precedents

  • Escalation Risks: If strikes are seen as disproportionate, they could fuel further Houthi attacks, creating a cycle of violence.
  • Erosion of IHL Norms: Repeated civilian harm without accountability weakens global adherence to laws of war.
  • Potential for Future Cases: If evidence of systematic violations emerges, legal challenges could arise in international courts or via sanctions.

Conclusion: Are US/UK Strikes Lawful?

  • Legally Defensible? The US/UK can argue self-defense and military necessity, but civilian harm incidents raise serious IHL concerns.
  • Accountability Gap: Lack of transparent investigations and reparations undermines claims of compliance.
  • Future Risks: If civilian casualties continue unchecked, legal challenges (e.g., ICC petitions, universal jurisdiction cases) could follow.

The demise of the U.S. ‘rule based order’?

The following is an AI Qwen based analysis of the impact of the U.S. ‘rule based international order’ and the reality of the chaos, wars and destruction its supposed ‘rules’ exert on the world.

The development of this post was promoted by the overwhelming number of New Zealand international political ‘analysts’ who quote the ‘U.S. rule based order’, (not the U.N. set of obligations) as some kind of golden age of civilisation , peace and freedom. -the reality could not be more stark. They fear that the new Trump administration-cum-oligarchy will no longer adhere to that ‘rule based order’ .

So why are these ‘analysts’ referring so enthusiastically to these great ‘rules’ that have caused so much suffering in the world?

It has recently been revealed (Feb.2025) via Wikileaks that the US government’s USAID ‘programme’ has been funding a US ‘non-government’ agency Internews Network, with millions upon millions of dollars to ensure Western media around the world regurgitate media messages ‘consistent’ (tell-tale identical phrasing in news items on issues from Covid responses to the Ukraine war and Russia), with US foreign policy objectives. Could it be that Western university international affairs ‘analysts’ (and politicians) have been similarly compromised over a long period of time?

I leave it to you to judge where their ‘influences’ come from.

AI analysis follows:

The concept of a “rules-based international order” is often invoked by the United States and its allies to describe a system of global governance that emphasizes adherence to international laws, norms, and institutions such as the United Nations, international treaties, and trade agreements. Proponents argue that this order promotes peace, stability, and cooperation among nations by providing a framework for resolving disputes and fostering mutual interests.

However, critics argue that the U.S.-led “rules-based order” has been selectively applied, often serving as a justification for military interventions, economic sanctions, and other forms of coercion that have led to significant human suffering, including mass murder, wars, and violence.

1. Selective Enforcement of Rules

  • Double Standards: Critics argue that the U.S. and its allies have frequently violated the very principles they claim to uphold. For example, the U.S. has engaged in military interventions without UN Security Council approval (e.g., the 2003 invasion of Iraq), while condemning other countries for similar actions. This selective enforcement undermines the legitimacy of the “rules-based order” and can lead to conflicts where weaker states feel justified in acting outside the system.
  • Regime Change and Destabilization: The U.S. has supported or directly engaged in regime change operations in countries like Iraq, Libya, and Syria, often under the guise of promoting democracy or protecting human rights. These interventions have frequently resulted in prolonged civil wars, state collapse, and mass civilian casualties. In Iraq, for instance, the 2003 invasion led to hundreds of thousands of deaths, widespread displacement, and the rise of extremist groups like ISIS.

2. Economic Warfare and Sanctions

  • Sanctions as a Tool of Coercion: The U.S. has frequently used economic sanctions as a tool to punish or pressure countries that defy its interests. While sanctions are often framed as a “non-violent” alternative to war, they can have devastating humanitarian consequences. For example, U.S. sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s contributed to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians due to lack of access to food, medicine, and clean water. Similarly, sanctions on countries like Venezuela and Iran have exacerbated economic crises, leading to widespread poverty and suffering.
  • Weaponizing Global Institutions: The U.S. has also been accused of weaponizing international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to impose structural adjustment programs on developing countries, which often result in austerity measures, increased inequality, and social unrest. This economic violence can indirectly fuel conflict and instability.

3. Proxy Wars and Arms Sales

  • Arming Conflicts: The U.S. is the world’s largest arms exporter, supplying weapons to both state and non-state actors around the globe. These arms sales often fuel conflicts in regions like the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. For example, U.S. arms supplied to Saudi Arabia have been used in the Yemeni Civil War, resulting in one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, with tens of thousands of civilians killed and millions facing famine.
  • Proxy Wars: During the Cold War, the U.S. engaged in numerous proxy wars, supporting anti-communist forces in places like Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Central America. These conflicts often involved backing authoritarian regimes or insurgent groups that committed atrocities against civilian populations. In Afghanistan, for example, U.S. support for the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War helped create conditions that eventually led to the rise of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

4. Militarization and the “War on Terror”

  • Global War on Terror: Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. launched the “Global War on Terror,” which has been used to justify military interventions, drone strikes, and indefinite detentions in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. These operations have often been conducted with little regard for international law or civilian casualties. Drone strikes, in particular, have been criticized for causing significant collateral damage, killing thousands of civilians, and radicalizing local populations.
  • Normalization of Violence: The rhetoric of the “rules-based order” often masks the normalization of violence as a means of achieving foreign policy objectives. The U.S. military-industrial complex benefits from perpetual warfare, and the language of “humanitarian intervention” or “counterterrorism” is sometimes used to legitimize aggressive military actions that result in mass death and destruction.

5. Undermining Sovereignty and Self-Determination

  • Imperialism and Neocolonialism: Critics argue that the U.S.-led “rules-based order” often serves as a cover for imperialist policies that undermine the sovereignty of weaker states. By imposing economic and political conditions on countries through institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO), the U.S. and its allies have been accused of perpetuating a form of neocolonialism that stifles self-determination and exacerbates inequality.
  • Resistance and Blowback: When countries resist U.S. hegemony or attempt to assert their independence, they are often subjected to punitive measures, including coups, invasions, or covert operations. This resistance can lead to cycles of violence, as seen in cases like Iran (1953 coup), Chile (1973 coup), and more recently, Venezuela and Syria. The blowback from these interventions can manifest in the form of terrorism, insurgency, and regional instability.

Conclusion

While the U.S. and its allies present the “rules-based international order” as a framework for peace and stability, critics argue that it has often been used to justify interventions, sanctions, and other forms of coercion that result in mass violence and human suffering. The selective application of rules, the militarization of foreign policy, and the prioritization of U.S. strategic interests over international law have contributed to a legacy of wars, destabilization, and humanitarian crises. In many cases, the very principles of sovereignty, self-determination, and human rights that the “rules-based order” claims to uphold are undermined by the actions of those who enforce it.

‘Cant Find My Way Home’

The heading for this post comes from one of the great compositions by Stevie Winwood and the UK band ‘Blind Faith’ in 1969.

It perhaps symbolises in 2024, the journey this human world is travelling and its likely future…

A world where pointless and savage wars in West Asia, Ukraine and Africa are spurred on by the quest for power and profit and where infantile ideologies predominate.

And a world where climate change continues its seemingly inexorable march towards a planet destroyed through the pure blind stupidity and ignorance of our ‘world leaders’.

Never before have we all been able to witness the savage brutality of a war of genocide in technicolour- never before have we seen Western media and politicians proselytising so blatantly for that inhumanity. An oh so stark reminder of the difference between Western weasel words about ‘freedom and democracy’ and their support of mass-murder when it profits them.

A reminder too that this has been the Western theme for 500 years of colonial exploitation of more vulnerable populations- that these centuries of exploitation are, in the immortal words in 2022 of EU’s blatantly racist and furiously stupid foreign policy chief Josep Borrell,  the reason why Europe and the West is a garden and the rest of the world (in his view), a jungle.

To support this meme, our Western mainstream media continues to idolise the fiction of Western supremacy in all things. As the evidence that this is no longer the case continues to pile up, Western media have resorted to ever greater contortions and lies to support that meme. The recent violence in Amsterdam between Israeli and Dutch football fans – characterised as ‘antisemitism’ is just one of many examples.

Time and time again we have seen European (and U.S. ) political leaders make decisions based on an outdated and irrelevant ideology which ignores all rationality and the reality of the situation.

The most telling, and likely deadly, example of this, is their farcical contortions to prove to their electorates that they doing something about climate change when they are in fact doing worse than nothing. There are no reductions in CO2 emissions, and the hype about the electrification of energy and transport is just that- electrification is not substituting for coal or oil, it comes as an addition to the continuing use of high rates of coal and oil burning.

Our ‘civilisation;’ is locked into endless ‘growth’ (an awful word given that economic ‘growth’ is the total opposite of true organic living growth) – a paradigm that is destroying the planet, but from which we apparently have no wish to escape from.

While climate and environmental scientists have long been steadily ratcheting up their estimations of the devastating impacts of global warming and biodiversity to the living fabric of our world, it is only now that economists from the ‘Network for Greening the Financial System’ are beginning to estimate the true fiscal costs to climate warming- something that could and should have been done 50 years ago, as it would have provided some leverage for real change in this money obsessed world. In the latest estimates economists estimate that global GDP will contract by 33% by 2100 from a 3C rise in global average surface temperatures. That 33% reduction in global GDP is almost certainly a huge underestimation of the real fiscal costs of global warming.

That ‘canary in the coalmine’ early warning system for economies, the cost of insurance, is already rising rapidly as a result of the rapidly increasing unpredictability of our climate systems.

We still do not know for certain what is going to happen to global sea currents and sea level rise as a result of ice melt , but early indications are that there will be a complete collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) within a few decades. When that collapse occurs, not only will much of the Northern Hemisphere become much colder, but the Southern Hemisphere will warm much much faster.

If that’s not enough, the 1972 bestseller Limits to Growth (LtG) authors (70 years ago) concluded that, if global society kept pursuing economic growth, it would experience a decline in food production, industrial output, and ultimately population, within this century. Recent remodelling of that study indicate ‘a halt in welfare, food, and industrial production over the next decade or so, which puts into question the suitability of continuous economic growth as humanity’s goal in the twenty-first century.’

And then we can go to the annual farce of the COP global conferences: the pretence that global leaders are in fact doing something about climate change, when in fact they are doing less than nothing- actively promoting more oil and gas exploration and consumption because endless ‘growth’ on a finite planet is a logical and sensible thing to do -isn’t it?

To hold everything together, so that we don’t lose our trajectory and deviate from accelerating over the climate change cliff, our mainstream and social media incessantly promotes consumption and the vital importance of the constant expansion of each country’s mythical GDP.

Have we completely forgotten our way home?

_______________________________________

References

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/nov/08/climate-breakdown-will-hit-global-growth-by-a-third-say-central-banks

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-39810-w

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jiec.13084

https://www.independent.ie/opinion/editorial/editorial-cop29-climate-summit-is-indeed-like-a-dark-joke-given-the-lack-of-buy-in-from-world-leaders/a131893267.html